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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
In re Heckl 1
(decided July 18, 2007)
Rosanna E. Heckl and her siblings ("the children") brought an
action to have their mother, Aida C., declared incapacitated, and
thereby have a court evaluator ("evaluator") appointed to watch over
both her and her property. Ultimately, the New York Supreme
Court, Erie County, ordered an evaluator to observe and speak to
Aida C., the alleged incapacitated person ("AIP").3 Thereafter, the
AIP appealed to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which
addressed whether the appointment of a court evaluator, pursuant to
New York Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL"), violated the AIP's protec-
tion against self-incrimination guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution4
or the New York Constitution,' when the information provided to the
court evaluator by the AIP may be used against her in a guardianship
proceeding. The appellate division affirmed, finding that while state-
ments made to an evaluator may implicate an AIP's liberty interest,
they do not give rise to the threat of criminal prosecution, and thus
the constitutional protections against self-incrimination do not at-
840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2007).
2 Id. at 518.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V, states, in pertinent part: "No person.., shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself ......
1
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tach.6
Under MHL Section 81.09(a), a court must assign an evalua-
tor to an AIP, following an order to show cause by the party seeking
the appointment.7 Once assigned, the evaluator has two conflicting
obligations.8 Initially, the evaluator must meet and interview the AIP
in order to submit an objective report to the court concerning the
AIP's needs, 9 including determinations which the AIP may resist or
object to, such as the necessity of counsel and assisted living.
10
However, the evaluator must also protect the interests of the AIP, in-
cluding safeguarding his or her property." Despite these often-
competing interests, the MHL contains a lone provision under which
AlPs may attempt to remove their evaluators. 12  MHL Section
81.10(g) provides that in the event the court appoints counsel for the
AIP, it may "dispense with the appointment of a court evaluator or
may vacate or suspend the appointment of a previously appointed
court evaluator." 13
During the initial proceedings, the AIP's children sought a de-
termination by the court, pursuant to MHL Section 81.09, that their
mother's mental state left her incapacitated, which therefore required
6 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
7 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(a) (McKinney 2004), states: "At the time of the issuance of
the order to show cause, the court shall appoint a court evaluator."
8 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
9 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(1), states: "The duties of the court evaluator shall in-
clude the following: meeting, interviewing, and consulting with the person alleged to be in-
capacitated regarding the proceeding."
'0 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
1 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(e), states, in pertinent part: "The court evaluator shall have
the authority to take the steps necessary to preserve the property of the person alleged to be
incapacitated ......
12 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
13 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(g) (McKinney 2004).
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a court appointed guardian to monitor her well-being.' 4 Specifically,
the children claimed that their eighty-year-old mother suffered from
dementia, which left her ill-equipped to handle the multiple tasks re-
quired of her on a daily basis.15 These responsibilities not only in-
cluded taking care of her own personal needs, but also encompassed
running Permclip Products Corporation ("Permclip"), for which she
was the president and sole shareholder.1 6 Additionally, the children
feared that their mother was being manipulated and taken advantage
of by others due to her fragile condition.17 However, the relationship
between the AIP and her children was undisputedly classified as "es-
tranged," and the AIP claimed that her children were simply acting
for self-gain, hoping to realize and control her money and Permclip.
18
Despite the AIP's claims, the court entered an order on Sep-
tember 20, 2006, granting the order to show cause and assigning an
evaluator to the AIP.' 9 Following the court's ruling, the AIP moved
to vacate the order, claiming that her "liberty interest [was] at stake"
and that enforcement of the court's decision would violate her protec-
tion against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the New York Constitution. 20 The AIP reasoned that sub-
jecting her to an evaluator's questioning, and requiring her to answer,
would infringe upon her constitutionally protected rights because her
14 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
"5 Id. at 519.
16 id.
17 Id.
18 Id. While the court noted that the family relationship was estranged, it offered no spe-
cifics as to the cause, and only mentioned that the reasons are disputed. Id.
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responses could be introduced into evidence at her guardianship pro-
ceeding.21 In addition, the AIP claimed that since she had retained
counsel, the court should dismiss the evaluator pursuant to MHL Sec-
tion 81.10(g), reasoning that if the court may dismiss an evaluator
when an attorney is appointed, then the same rule should apply when
the AIP hires her own counsel.22 However, on November 22, 2006,
the court denied the motion and ordered that the evaluator "immedi-
ately" meet with the AIP.23
Regardless of the court's clear directive, the AIP continued to
refuse to speak with the evaluator.24 In response, the children moved
to have their mother found in contempt, and thus face fines or im-
prisonment for her continued failure to follow the court's orders. On
January 24, 2007, the court granted the AIP one last chance to com-
ply by giving her ten days from its entry of an order to meet with the
evaluator, after which, failure to comply would result in her being
held in contempt. Thereafter, the AIP appealed to the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, which affirmed in part and reversed in
part, the lower court's decision.26 Specifically, the appellate division
affirmed the lower court's ruling as to the appointment of the evalua-
tor and found it did not violate the AIP's constitutional rights, but re-
versed the order of civil contempt that sought to punish the AIP for
21 Id. at 518-19.
22 Id. at 519.
23 Id. at 518.
24 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 518-19.
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failing to meet with the evaluator.27
The appellate division did not dispute that the AIP's liberty
interests were at stake, stating that "her most basic rights" were un-
deniably at risk during her guardianship proceeding. 28 However, the
court found that the federal and state constitutional protections
against self-incrimination did not extend to the AIP's guardianship
proceeding.29 The court noted that even where a liberty interest is at
stake " 'the right against seltU-]incrimination does not attach in all
instances.' ,30 Specifically, the court articulated that the protections
against self-incrimination are not implicated in an administrative or
civil context, where there is no reasonable apprehension of a criminal
prosecution.31 Therefore, since the AIP was not subject to any fore-
seeable criminal proceedings, she was not entitled to the federal and
state constitutional protection against self-incrimination.32
The Heckl Court referred to the United States Supreme Court
decision of In re Gault,33 which established the degree to which the
U.S. Constitution protects the right against self-incrimination. In
Gault, a minor was taken into police custody after he and another boy
allegedly made lewd phone calls to a neighbor.34 Subsequently, the
minor met with the Juvenile Court Judge ("Judge") in his chambers
27 Id.
28 Id. at 520.
29 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
30 Id. (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986)).
31 Id. (citing Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967)).
32 id.
33 387 U.S. at 1.
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to discuss the alleged inappropriate phone calls.35 The minor was
only accompanied by his mother and older brother, neither of whom
were informed that the minor was not required to make any state-
ments.36 In addition, the proceeding was not recorded nor memorial-
ized in any way.37 Following the meeting, the judge held a hearing to
determine the minor's fate.38 During the hearing, additional testi-
mony was given concerning the minor's statements, which, like the
prior meeting, was also not documented.39 Despite varying accounts
of what the minor had said in both hearings, the judge declared that
the minor was a delinquent and committed him to the State Industrial
School until he reached the age of majority. n
Since appeals were not permitted in juvenile cases, a habeas
corpus petition was filed claiming that the minor was not afforded his
protection against self-incrimination guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion.4 1 The petition was heard in the Arizona Superior Court, where
the State argued that the Fifth Amendment only provided protection
against statements relating to criminal matters, and since juvenile
proceedings were considered civil, the protection against self-
incrimination did not attach. 42 At the proceeding, the minor's coun-
sel cross-examined the Judge about the circumstances surrounding
31 Id. at 5.
36 Id. at 5, 43-44.
31 Id. at 5.
38 Gault, 387 U.S. at 6.
'9 Id. at 7.
40 Id. at 6-7.
41 Id. at 8-10.
42 Id. at 49.
1332 [Vol. 25
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his questioning of the minor.43 In explaining his conduct, the Judge
provided "vague" reasoning for his decisions concerning his treat-
ment of the minor, however, the court accepted his explanation and
subsequently dismissed the writ.44 Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, 45 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.46
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the protections of
the Fifth Amendment cannot be wholly eliminated for a class of indi-
viduals, such as juveniles, simply because the State designates the
proceeding non-criminal, but rather one must look to the "nature of
the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. 47 The
Court articulated that the reasoning behind the Fifth Amendment is to
protect a person's liberty interest, and thus one cannot "disregard
substance" merely because it involves a non-criminal proceeding.48
Furthermore, the Court asserted that when someone's liberty interest
is violated as a result of being unwillingly incarcerated, the label at-
tached to the proceeding does not alter the significance of that per-
son's interest. 49 In addition, the Court noted that the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination should be construed
43 Gault, 387 U.S. at 8.
44 Id. at 9. The judge claimed that the minor was " 'habitually involved in immoral mat-
ters.' " Id. As a basis for his claim, the Judge spoke of an unsubstantiated incident he had
heard of two years prior, involving the minor stealing another boy's baseball glove. Id. In
addition, the judge referred back to the statement made in his chambers where he alleged the
minor had admitted to making additional inappropriate phone calls in the past. Id.
45 Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
46 id.
41 Id. at 49.
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broadly, and applied "generously. ' 50 Therefore, the privilege may be
invoked regardless of the type of proceeding so long as the statement
"is or may be inculpatory" or where the " 'witness may reasonably
apprehend [that the statement] could be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion. 51
In contrast, the Court in Allen v. Illinois52 affirmed an Illinois
Supreme Court decision that denied a defendant his protection
against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding, which threatened to
place him in a psychiatric care facility.53 In Allen, the defendant was
charged with criminal violations relating to sexual misconduct.54
Due to the defendant's criminal acts, the State of Illinois ("State")
brought a civil action under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act ("Act"), to have the defendant declared a sexually dangerous per-
son, and accordingly sent to a psychiatric facility.
55
In order to comply with the Act, the defendant was required to
undergo two psychiatric examinations, which would then be used to
help determine whether to send him to the facility. 56 After the com-
pletion of the evaluations, the defendant objected to the admissibility
of statements he made to the psychiatrists because he claimed it
would violate his protection against self-incrimination.5" In response,
the trial court limited the psychiatrists' testimony to their opinions of
50 Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
51 Id. at 47-49 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J.,
concurring)).
52 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
" Id. at 367-68.
54 Id. at 365.
" Id. at 366, 369.
56 Id. at 366.
17 Allen, 478 U.S. at 366.
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the defendant based on the examinations, and thereby precluded any
testimony as to the specific statements made by the defendant.58 At
the conclusion of the trial, the defendant was found to be a sexually
dangerous person under the Act, and was therefore required to be
admitted into a mental health facility.59
Subsequently, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court
of Illinois for the Third District, which reversed, concluding that the
defendant was deprived of his Fifth Amendment protection.60 How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, finding that the defen-
dant's protection against self-incrimination did not attach in a civil
proceeding that simply concerned treatment. 6 Thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.62
The Court affirmed, holding that in a non-criminal proceeding
where treatment rather than punishment is the ultimate objective, the
defendant is not afforded protection against self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment.63 Although the Court asserted that labeling a
proceeding something other than criminal is not dispositive of
whether the Fifth Amendment may be invoked, it stated that in non-
criminal proceedings a defendant must provide " 'the clearest of
proof that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State's] intention.' ,64 In determining whether
the defendant satisfied this test, the Court relied on two key points
58 Id.
" Id. at 367.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Allen, 478 U.S. at 368.
63 Id. at 369-70.
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that distinguish Allen from the Court's decision in Gault.65 Initially,
the Court stated that the proposition outlined in Gault, declaring that
the protections of the Fifth Amendment are invoked whenever one's
liberty interests are at stake, is "plainly not good law." 66 Moreover,
the Court articulated that the threat of confinement in and of itself
does not operate as a shield, which automatically affords a person
Fifth Amendment protections, but rather it is simply one factor to be
considered. 67 The second distinction the Court addressed was the dif-
ferent purposes between the Act at issue and the statute in Gault.
68
While both cases involved non-criminal proceedings, the Court em-
phasized that the purpose behind the statute in Gault was to punish,
while the intent behind the Act was to treat sexually dangerous per-
sons. 69 The Court reasoned that " ' [t]he state has a legitimate inter-
est . . . in providing care to its citizens who are unable ... to care for
themselves.' ,70 Therefore, absent a showing that the purpose behind
an individual's threatened confinement conforms with that of some-
one facing criminal charges, the Act is outside the scope of the pro-
tections of the Fifth Amendment.7'
Although the court in Heckl, much like the Court in Allen, in-
terpreted the protection against self-incrimination narrowly, in In re
United Health Services Hospitals Inc.,72 the New York Supreme
65 Id. at 372.
66 Id.
67 Allen, 478 U.S. at 372.
61 Id. at 373.
69 Id.
70 Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
"' Id. at 373.
72 785 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 2004).
1336 [Vol. 25
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Court found that AlPs retain their federal and state constitutional pro-
tections during guardianship proceedings.73 In United Health an AIP
was called to the stand at his own guardianship proceeding and was
asked to testify about his condition.74 The AIP's attorney objected,
arguing that since the AIP's liberty interest was at stake he could not
be forced to testify against himself under the U.S. Constitution and
the New York Constitution.75
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Broome County,
was faced with virtually the identical issue the appellate division
faced in Heckl: whether AlPs can be compelled to answer questions
concerning matters that will directly affect their liberty interest. The
court held that AIPs could not be denied their constitutional protec-
tion in a proceeding where their most fundamental liberty interests
are at stake simply because it involves a non-criminal proceeding.76
As a case of first impression in New York, the court drew
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Gault. The court asserted that
the deprivation of liberty faced by juveniles, such as the minor in
Gault, is no greater than what is at stake for AlPs at a guardianship
proceeding, and therefore AlPs should be afforded the same constitu-
tional protections. 77 The court noted that both juveniles and AlPs are
subject to incarceration against their will, and with AlPs, the guardian
may even have the power to make decisions affecting life or death.78
" Id. at 317.
74 Id. at 313.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 316-17.
77 United Health, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
78 Id. at 316. The court, when talking about life and death decisions, was referring to the
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Also, the court affirmatively addressed the limited holding in Allen,
finding that " 'there is a threat of self-incrimination whenever there is
a deprivation of liberty'; and there is such a deprivation whatever the
name of the institution, if a person is held against his will.' ,79 In ad-
dition, the court mentioned that the Court of Appeals has plainly
stated that an individual's civil rights remain intact where loss of lib-
erty is at stake.80  Furthermore, the court asserted that the "leading
treatise on guardianship in New York" makes clear that there is no
support for the proposition that AlPs are without their protection
against self-incrimination at guardianship proceedings. 81 The court
determined, therefore, that it is "inherently offensive to our Constitu-
tion" to force AlPs to testify at a guardian proceeding where their an-
swers may be used to strip their liberty interests away.
82
Prior to United Health, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, in In re Ashley,83 held that a father's right against self-
incrimination was not violated when he was sent to prison for refus-
ing to admit to sexually abusing his daughter during court ordered
treatment.84 In Ashley, the family court found that a father had been
HYG. LAW § 81.29(e) (McKinney 2004))).
'9 United Health, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 314 (quoting McNeil v. Patuxent Institution, 478
U.S.245, 257 (1986) (Douglas, J., concurring)). However, the court acknowledged that not
every state has followed the principles set forth in Justice Douglas' opinion. Id. at 314. The
court referred to a case decided by the Oregon Appellate Court, which found that a mentally
ill person was not entitled to protection against self-incrimination at a proceeding determin-
ing his committal to an institution. Id. (citing In re Matthews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. 1980)).
80 Id. at 315 (citing Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986)).
81 Id. at 315. (citing ROBERT ABRAMS, GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE
583-585 (New York State Bar Association 1997)).
82 United Health, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
83 683 N.Y.S.2d 304 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998).
84 Id. at 304-05.
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sexually abusing his child. As a result, the father was required to
enter, and successfully complete, a treatment program for sexual of-
fenders where he had a variety of obligations.86 Although the father
complied with the majority of the treatment's requirements, such as
mandatory attendance and completing assignments, he failed to admit
that he was responsible for sexually abusing his daughter.87 Since the
treatment program's success hinges on the patient accepting account-
ability for his actions, the father was released from the program.
88
Thereafter, the family court found that the father had failed to comply
with the order of disposition, and as a result he was sentenced to six-
months in jail.89
The father appealed the ruling, claiming that he failed to ad-
mit sexually abusing his daughter because of his right against self-
incrimination guaranteed by both the New York Constitution and the
U.S. Constitution.90 The appellate division held that while the protec-
tion against self-incrimination may be invoked in family court pro-
ceedings, one may only do so when he or she is faced with a "sub-
stantial and real danger of criminal prosecution." 9' The court
distinguished the father's situation from that of someone faced with a
"real danger of criminal prosecution" by noting that the father was in
treatment rather than on the stand, and therefore the questioning
about the abuse to his daughter was done in a therapeutic setting
85 Id. at 305 n.2.
86 Id. at 304.
87 Id.
88 Ashley, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
81 Id. at 304-05.
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which would not give rise to a "reasonable fear" of criminal prosecu-
92tion.
The Fifth Amendment, contained in the U.S. Constitution and
replicated in the New York Constitution, is an individual right of this
nation's citizens to be free from being forced to testify against one-
self.93 This right represents the founding fathers' belief that a na-
tion's populace must be afforded protection from their government.
94
The text of the Fifth Amendment, however, limits the right
against self-incrimination to criminal proceedings.95 Therefore, the
Supreme Court has tried to determine who exactly comes within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment, leading to inconsistent interpreta-
tions and confusion among the lower courts. The Court's earlier deci-
sion in Gault, provided a broad interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, one that is more concerned about the rights at stake for the
individual in a particular case, rather than the label attached to that
particular proceeding.96 However, the Court's later decision in Allen
takes a more narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment by shift-
ing the focus of the inquiry from an individuals' liberty interest,
which the Court relied upon in Gault, and instead applied a more
stringent interpretation of "criminal proceedings." 97
The more pragmatic approach applied in Gault allowed the
Court to look beyond the fact that the case was a non-criminal pro-
92 id.
93 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
94 Allen, 478 U.S. at 383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96 Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
9' Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
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ceeding, and instead enabled it to focus on the consequences facing
the juvenile when he was forced to give up his Fifth Amendment
right; thus resulting in the Court upholding the juvenile's right
against self-incrimination." However, the more formalistic approach
taken in Allen led the Court to deny the protections of the Fifth
Amendment in a proceeding that threatened to place the defendant in
a psychiatric facility, because the Court determined that the purpose
of the incarceration was therapeutic rather than punitive. 99 This nar-
rower approach does not seem to be in line with the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment, which the framers crafted to create an equilibrium
between the government and its citizens by increasing the strength of
the latter while decreasing the strength of the former. 00 This was
based on the idea that the individual is vulnerable compared to the
State and allowing the State to use its power to coerce its citizens into
incriminating themselves would deprive them of their freedom.' 0'
In keeping with the framer's intent, an AIP is in an even
greater position of need for the protections of the Fifth Amendment
than that of the average citizen. An AIP stands to lose not only his or
her freedom, but may even lose the power to decide whether to live
or die. 10 2 In addition to these serious consequences, it must also be
considered that the subject of the guardianship proceeding is alleged
to be incapacitated, theoretically making he or she even more vulner-
able to coercion than an ordinary criminal defendant. The Court in
98 Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
99 Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70.
10 Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
1o1 Id.
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Gault made a similar distinction in allowing the Fifth Amendment to
apply in a juvenile proceeding; "[i]t would indeed be surprising if the
privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened crimi-
nals but not to children."' 0 3 The Court's "surprise" stems from what
it believed to be a central purpose to the privilege against self-
incrimination, "prevent[ing] the state, ... by force or by psychologi-
cal domination, from overcoming the mind ... of the person under
investigation."'' 0 4 Therefore, the mind of a child, much like the mind
of someone with questionable mental capacity, is even more vulner-
able to this type of "psychological domination."
While the court in United Health, used this line of thinking to
uphold an AIP's privilege against self-incrimination, the court in
Heckl refused to do so.1°5 Instead, the court in Heckl used the more
formalistic approach utilized by the Court in Allen, finding that de-
spite the undisputed implication of the AIP's liberty interest, she was
not protected by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on self-
incrimination because her testimony would not subject her to any
foreseeable criminal prosecutions. 0 6 However, despite the court in
Heckl finding that the AIP was not entitled to these protections, it
nevertheless held, without much explanation, that she could not be
forced to meet with the evaluator.'0 7 Initially this would seem like a
success for the AIP, who is alleviated from having to talk to the
evaluator, and thus seemingly victorious in securing that her testi-
103 Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
104 Id.
105 See United Health, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17; Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
106 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
107 Id. at 521.
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mony will not be used against her. The court's decision, however,
cannot be read as a victory for the AIP. In making its determination,
the court stated that while it cannot force the AIP to speak with the
evaluator, her failure to do so would only make it more likely that she
would be found incapacitated; thereby leaving her liberty even more
at risk. 0 8 In other words, the court is leaving the AIP with two unat-
tractive choices: either speak to the evaluator and risk having those
statements used against her; or refuse to speak and thereby forgo hav-
ing an independent evaluation of her condition, which would signifi-
cantly hamper her liberty interest.
The decision in Heckl is therefore a curious one; the court
spends the majority of the opinion explaining that the AIP is not pro-
tected from meeting with the evaluator based on Fifth Amendment
grounds, yet holds, through some ambiguous language that the AIP
cannot be forced to talk to the evaluator. This holding, however,
does little to help quell the concerns of ALPs, since talking to the
evaluator or refusing to talk to an evaluator will be used against the
AIP, and therefore it fails to secure essential rights for a vulnerable






Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 4, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/16
